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Sticks, Carrots and all the Rest:
Lombardy and the Spanish strategy
in Northern Italy between Europe
and the Mediterranean (part. 2)
Mario Rizzo
Consensus and resources: the co-optation of Italian princes and magnates
1 In analysing the many elements of Spanish strategy in Italy, special attention must be
paid to the co-optation of the élites, whether of the indigenous baronial or aristocratic
classes of the Habsburg territories or of their peers in the independent Italian states. This
was a cornerstone of the Grand Strategy of the Spanish Habsburg composite monarchy,
which had to rely heavily on a multi-tiered system of patronage.1 The granting of business
opportunities, offices, executive posts, honorific titles and dignities, pensions, gifts, and
other  mercedes  (rewards)  to  members  of  these élites  fostered political  consensus and
broadened support for Spanish strategic interests. Those who received this patronage in
most cases shared interests, attitudes, and values with their benefactors.2 Spanish power
depended upon a sense of inclusiveness, as the political history of Genoa in the 1570s
(examined above) demonstrates. Significantly, mercedes were granted even to people of
middling social rank.3 In Lombardy appointments for two-year offices, that is, positions
that were considered relatively less important and prestigious, were usually granted to
minor figures. Far from neglecting these apparently petty issues, in 1592 Philip II wrote to
his governor in Milan, ordering him to appoint ‘learned, virtuous, experienced, and upright
people’, but at the same time urging him to choose ‘subjects of mine and mostly … Lombards,
so that they be rewarded for their staunchness and devotion’.4
2 At  a  higher  level,  soft  power  proved to  be  a  valuable  tool  to  form or  reinforce  the
attachment to Madrid in a number of ways: for instance, Giannettino Doria, one of Gian
Andrea Doria’s sons, studied at the very prestigious University of Salamanca, the heart of
Castilian culture and tradition.5 Big carrots (in the shape of arranged marriages, honours,
offices, pensions, commands, and so forth) were offered to high-ranking and influential
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figures, of whom there were a disproportionately large number in northern Italy – rulers
of  small  states,  feudal  lords,  members  of  rich  and  powerful  families,  local  notables,
clergymen, officials,  or courtly dignitaries.6 In this way, regional and local élites were
bound to the Spanish Monarchy. A few outstanding Genoese cases have been mentioned
already. By way of example, amongst Lombards it is worth mentioning Paolo Sfondrati,7
Sforza Moroni,8 Camillo Castiglioni,9 Alfonso della Somaglia, 10 Marco Antonio Simonetta, 11
Gio. Giacomo Belgioioso,12 Renato Borromeo.13 Other subjects of the State of Milan, such as
Gabrio Serbelloni,  Ambrogio Landriano, Bernabò Barbo, Edoardo Lanzavecchia, will  be
mentioned in the following pages on account of their outstanding military skills. But we
should  not  overlook  military  and  political  figures  such as  Giovanni  Anguissola  from
Piacenza  or  Pirro  Malvezzi  from  Bologna,  which  was  also  the  home  town  of  the
Bentivoglios, a couple of whom also served Philip II.14 
3 In Savoy, for instance, Philip could count on Andrea Provana di Leinì, Filippo d’Este, Carlo
Pallavicino, and other counsellors of Charles EmanuelI,15 as well as the president of the
senate  Lazzaro  Baratta  and  the  first  secretary  of  state  Agostino  Ripa.16 Vespasiano
Gonzaga,  Duke  of  Sabbioneta,  is  another  outstanding  case:  he  enjoyed  prestigious
commands and later on was successively appointed viceroy of Navarre,  Valencia,  and
Naples.17 Not surprisingly, a similar effort to recruit and engage influential figures in Italy
was also made by the French Monarchy.18
4 At the top level, this approach implied the co-optation of major sovereign princes (like
those of Savoy, Florence, Parma, or Ferrara) and their relatives, by appointing them to
prestigious executive posts,19 granting military commands, 20 conceding honours, 21 paying
pensions,22 making  presents, 23 arranging  marriages,24 transferring  land,25 sometimes
interfering in and taking advantage of family dissensions,26 or admitting at court a heir
apparent in order to give him a cultural,  political,  and military education suitable to
Spanish interests27 – a peculiar practice of soft power.
5 The young Alessandro Farnese presents a perspicuous example of this use of soft power,
one which sheds light on the changing relationship between the Spanish Habsburgs and
the dukes of Parma and Piacenza. After very troubled times in the 1540s (the disputes
between the first duke Pier Luigi Farnese, Charles V, and the governor of Milan, Ferrante
Gonzaga cannot be examined in detail  here) and some tumultuous years in the early
1550s  (with  Duke  Ottavio  leaning  towards  Henry  II  of  France),  relations  improved
significantly in and after 1556, thanks to Charles’s abdication and the entente between
Ottavio and Philip II following the Treaty of Ghent.28 In abandoning the French side and
pragmatically accepting Spanish hegemony,29 Ottavio brought about a remarkable shift in
his international alliances, winning in exchange Philip’s precious support in his effort to
consolidate his still unsteady young state. The treaty included the restitution of Piacenza
and its territory to the Duke, although he had to accept a Spanish garrison in the city’s
fort as a guarantee of his loyalty to Madrid until 1585, when it was finally withdrawn as a
reward for Alessandro Farnese’s oustanding (and for him extremely expensive) service in
Flanders.30
6 The Treaty of Ghent influenced Alessandro’s life from boyhood, as he had been given as a
hostage to the Spanish court. His father’s good conduct and respect for the terms of the
treaty were thereby guaranteed. In Madrid the young Italian prince absorbed Spanish
moral  values  and  cultural  attitudes,  experienced  its  political  practices  and  acquired
military skills – in a word, he had been brought up just like a Spanish Habsburg, thus
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developing  a  life-style  and  a  Weltanschauung typical  of  that  world.  On  such  firm
foundations  an  outstanding  military  and  political  leader  was  founded,  and  a  crucial
geopolitical  liaison  with  the  duchy  of  Parma  and  Piacenza  had  been  tightened.  Not
surprisingly,  Alessandro was  to  prove  himself  to  be not  merely  one  of  those  Italian
princes inclined to a pragmatic alliance with the Spanish Habsburgs: in many respects, he
had become one of them, one of the happy few.31
7 Although their careers were marked by a lesser-degree of identification with the Spanish
Habsburg  pattern  and  system  of  power,  two  other  important  Italian  crown  princes
enjoyed an education in Madrid that was in many respects comparable to that afforded to
Farnese:  Emanuel  Philibert  of  Savoy and Francesco de  Medici.  Francesco,  the  son of
Cosimo, stayed at the court of Philip II  in 1561-2. He shared this distinction with his
brother Pietro, who served there a few years later.32 The logical next step in Francesco’s
career was to marry Jane of Austria. Later on Philip II, through his personal envoy, stood
as godfather to their  son:  propitiously,  the child was named Philip.  As an archduke,
Francesco would pursue a policy that was usually inclined towards Madrid’s wishes: he
was well-known for his spagnolismo.33
8 Emanuel Philibert’s elder brother, Ludovico, was sent to Madrid to be brought up in the
Spanish way – alla spagnola.  Ludovico was the heir to the duchy of Savoy and his loyalty
to  Madrid  was  deemed  to  be  of  prime  importance.34 When  Ludovico  died,  the  cadet
Emanuel Philibert took his place as the new crown prince.35 He spent a few years in Turin
and Nice,  during which time his  mother,  Beatrice  of  Portugal,  deeply  influenced his
education. As Charles V’s sister-in-law, she introduced a new Iberian style and concept of
power in the court of Savoy.36  Then, at the age of nearly seventeen, Emanuel Philibert
went to the court of his uncle-in-law Charles V. The young prince quickly fell under the
spell of the Emperor, but he also succeeded in gaining his uncle’s favour and respect; in
time he succeeded in placing himself on intimate terms with his cousin Philip; honours
and  offices  were  showered  upon  him;  he  acquainted  himself  with  military  life  and
leadership and experienced the day-to-day intricacies of courtly life. 
9 In short, he received the education necessary for a prince, one which gave him familiarity
with the many facets of statesmanship, from royal finances to diplomacy.37 His career in
the  Emperor’s  service  reached  its  zenith  in  1553  when  Charles  V  appointed  him
commander-in-chief of the Army of Flanders. Charles’s abdication a few years later did
not  damage  Emanuel  Philibert’s  prospects,  and  the  new  king  soon  appointed  him
governor of Flanders. Philip’s faith in his Italian cousin was well-placed, as the victory at
St Quentin demonstrated. In turn the Catholic King assisted Emanuel Philibert to regain
the Duchy of Savoy.38
10 It has to be admitted that no strictly-deterministic nexus can be established between
Emanuel Philibert’s experience as a boy and a young man and his subsequent conduct as a
duke: the ruler of a strategically-crucial state, seeking a certain degree of neutrality and
latitude between Madrid and Paris,  certainly he was no puppet in Philip’s hands,  yet
neither did Habsburg rulers in Madrid and Milan always comply with the duke’s requests
or support his ambitions.39 Nevertheless, the first stages of his private and public life were
spent  predominantly  in  a  Habsburg  milieu,  and this  formative  period  clearly  deeply
influenced his later actions in both foreign and domestic affairs.40 A revealing indication of
the  importance  attached  by  the  Habsburgs  to  a  suitable  upbringing  lies  in  the
considerable pressure exerted by Philip II on Emanuel Philibert after 1571 in order that
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the heir  to the throne,  Charles Emanuel,  should be brought up cattolicamente (in the
Catholic  way),  if  possible  in  Spain.  The inference was  that  this  measure alone could
prevent any possible pernicious religious and political influence being brought to bear on
the duke in his tender years. In fact, the prince – who in 1585 married Philip’s younger
daughter Catalina Micaela41 – was raised and educated in the duchy; however, plans for his
schooling were changed quite considerably by Philip II’s insistence that he be taught
cattolicamente, and all his original tutors were substituted.42 Subsequently Charles Emanuel
would turn out to be a more pro-Habsburg ruler than his father.43
11 For  the Spanish Habsburgs,  co-optation was  not  only  an irreplaceable  instrument  to
create  consensus.  It  also  had  a  second,  vital  function:  that  of  providing  human,
professional, and economic resources, indispensable to the wider strategic efforts of the
monarchy.44 Together with taxation, co-optation was one of the most important means
through which non-Iberian components (as well as some non-Habsburg areas) could be
induced to make their  essential  contribution to the running of  the Spanish Empire.45
Several  Lombard  and  Italian  magnates  were  able  to  finance  (and  sometimes
simultaneously to lead) the tremendously expensive imperial campaigns; many others
held political, diplomatic, technical, and administrative offices of all ranks.46 
12 Moreover,  the  Italian  peninsula  was  particularly  rich  in  ‘skilful,  experienced,  and
authoritative soldiers’, and these men were appointed to all manner of positions within the
military-administrative system: they commanded regiments and fortresses, oversaw the
levying of soldiers and the construction of defensive works, and performed an array of
bureaucratic functions in the army or fleet.  In addition,  they were frequently put in
charge of covert operations.47 Suffice to mention Gabrio Serbelloni,48 Giovanni Anguissola,49 
Ambrogio Landriano,50 Bernabò Barbo, 51 Pirro Malvezzi, 52 Edoardo Lanzavecchia,53 Ottavio
Farnese,54 Sigismondo55 and Ottavio Gonzaga56 – all men whose distinguished careers were
spent  in  the  service  of  the  Spanish  Habsburgs.  How  important,  ubiquitous,  and
continuous was the service of Italian magnates can be easily deduced from the rolls of the
military units fighting for the Monarquía all over Europe during the last decades of the
sixteenth century.57
Sticks, carrots, and soft power: reflections on Spanish strategy and the State of Milan
13 The study of sixteenth-century Lombardy clearly demonstrates that strategy concerns
peace  (and ‘non-war’)  as  much as  open war.  It  also  corroborates  the  argument  that
Spanish pre-eminence in  Europe and the Mediterranean in the Cinquecento was  not
merely  or  simply  a  matter  of  soldiers,  weapons,  and  ships58 –  in  other  words,  a
demonstration of hard power. As we have seen, soft power was of profound importance in
shaping Spanish actions. Furthermore, even in those instances in which hard power was
deployed in an emphatic way, this branch of Madrid’s strategy was as much concerned
with (political and economic) carrots as with (military) sticks.59 In northern and central
Italy a wide range of strategic methods and tools were employed; the needs and demands
of a variety of  strategic actors (who were often anything but submissive to Madrid’s
demands) had to be taken into consideration.60 Needless to say, none of these actors could
compete with the Spanish superpower as an equal, but they all played the Italian strategic
game, and indeed some of them were major players. As a former Genoese doge wrote in
his journal in 1615, ‘li Spagnuoli … si sono avveduti … che un solo Principe d’Italia basta a
tenerli il bacile alla barba’ (the Spaniards have realized that even a single Italian prince
can be enough to bring about serious problems to them).61
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14 Spanish  Grand  Strategy  was  therefore  extremely  sophisticated.  Although  it  most
definitely was not a flawless instrument of power,62 it nevertheless skillfully – though not
always successfully – balanced the use of violence (or the threat to resort to it,  as a
deterrent) with the exertion of economic and financial pressures upon key points, as well
as with ideological propaganda, extensive patronage networks, innumerable diplomatic
initiatives,  far-reaching  intelligence  systems,  and  one-off  incentives  offered  to
individuals, families, and groups.63 This was a cocktail intended to foster consensus in the
Spanish  dominions,  and  thus  to  enhance  the  mobilization  and  management  of  the
crown’s multiple resources, to collect information about and (whenever possible) hinder
French  and  Ottoman  strategic  plans,  to  expand  the  Spanish  zone  of  influence  by
attracting new allies and aderenti (minor potentates, federated with or recommended to
major polities),64 to prevent key strategic actors from falling under the influence of Paris.65
15 In  the  international  theatre,  political  and  strategic  relations  usually  do  not  merely
reproduce  proportionally  the  existing  dimensions  of  military  force.  Not  surprisingly,
therefore, Madrid could not solve all  its strategic problems by the employment of its
tercios and galleys.  In this it  was no different to twentieth- and twenty-first-century
Great Powers, who similarly found (and continue to find) that in many circumstances
they  cannot  deploy  their  full  military  potential.  To  keep  the  status  quo  in  such  an
intricate area as northern Italy was no easy task for the Habsburg rulers in Milan and
Madrid.  They substantially succeeded in maintaining and even strengthening Spanish
pre-eminence,66 but this achievement was the fruit of unending labour. The one constant
in this Habsburg system was that new challenges would arise to it. Formidable as it was,
Spanish  hegemony  in  Italy  was  never  established  once  and  for  all;  it  needed  to  be
patiently protected, re-established, maintained, and shored-up on a day-by-day basis. The
Pax Hispanica in the peninsula could by no means be taken for granted: on the contrary,
it was the outcome of a most complex process, the result of numerous competing – and
unremitting – agencies, methods, and relations.67
16 The strategic influence exerted by the Spanish superpower over the Italian peninsula was
doubtless largely based on its overwhelming military force,68 both actual and potential.
Moreover,  every  so  often  individual  statesmen  or  lobbies  proposed,  supported,  or
implemented hawkish approaches to Italian and Mediterranean affairs.69 Was it better to
continue  the  old  policy  of  management,  or  to  attempt  to  redraw  the  map  through
military force and heavy political pressure? This was the question that on some occasions
kept Charles V and Philip II on the horns of a crucial strategic dilemma. The fact remains,
however, that in most cases Spanish Habsburg rulers tended to stick to the traditional
strategy  of  maintaining  paz  y  quietud  in  the  peninsula.  The  more  cautious  voices
frequently  prevailed.70 In  all  likelihood,  the  unsuccessful  invasion  of  Finale  in  1571
strengthened this tendency.71 
17 The chimera of an even tighter domination of the peninsula competed with the reality of
constant  balances  and  checks  to  Spain’s  power  in  sixteenth-century  Italy.  Thus,  the
recourse to a diversified strategy, one based predominantly upon carrots and soft power
and in which military hard power – the stick - served usually as a means of deterrence
rather than as a form of chastisement or outright conquest, turned out to be the best one
for  Madrid  in  a  great  number  of  Italian  affairs.  Philip’s  II  unquestionable  military
superiority in the peninsula ensured that strategic restraint,72 measured in efforts to build
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up consensus,  often proved more  profitable  to  Spanish Grand Strategy  than did  the
blatant flexing of muscles.73
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RÉSUMÉS
Cette  communication a  pour but  d’étudier  la  stratégie  espagnole dans la  Lombardie  du XVI°
siècle, en replaçant les développements politiques, sociaux et militaires dans le cadre de l’Italie
du Nord, au sein d’une Europe plus large et inscrits dans le tissu méditerranéen.
This  paper  adopts  a  comprehensive  approach  to  Spanish  strategy  in  sixteenth-century
Lombardy, one which places political, social, economic, and military developments in northern
Italy within a wider European and Mediterranean framework.
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